The Crashworthiness Doctrine - A Search for a Rational Answer in Florida by Rossman, Stephen F. & Bramnick, James S.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
10-1-1974
The Crashworthiness Doctrine - A Search for a
Rational Answer in Florida
Stephen F. Rossman
James S. Bramnick
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation




THE CRASHWORTHINESS DOCTRINE-A SEARCH
FOR A RATIONAL ANSWER IN FLORIDA
STEPHEN F. ROSSMAN* AND JAMES S. BRAMNICK**
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 70
II. AUTOMOBILE PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN GENERAL .............................. 73
III. EVANS AND ITS PROGENY .................................................. 74
IV. THE LARSEN APPROACH .................................................... 79
V. THE FLORIDA VIEW POINT .................................................. 83
V I. C ON CLUSION .............................................................. 88
I. INTRODUCTION
Evans and Larsen, continuing their national battle for
supremacy ... have enunciated "second collision" principles
precisely poles apart. Their clashing concept as to the ap-
propriate legal principle controlling manufacturers' liability
for design defects producing enhanced injuries in motor vehi-
cle accidents but not causing or contributing to the initial
collision, has led to a new "War between the States" unsur-
passed since 1865.1
As recently as 10 years ago, the terms "second accident" and
"secondary impact" were relatively unknown. However, as noted
above by one court, the past decade has produced one of the most
serious conflicts in the history of the judiciary. Rarely have so many
jurisdictions become so divided on one particular issue in so short a
time . 2
* Member of the Florida Bar; Partner in the firm of Rossman & Baumberger, Miami,
Florida.
** Digest Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor, Research & Writ-
ing.
1. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 20 Md. App. 518, __, 317 A.2d 494, 495 (Ct. Spec.
App. 1974) (footnotes omitted).
2. The following jurisdictions have held that a manufaciurer must produce a crashworthy
vehicle:
California
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Badorek
v. General Motors Corp., 12 Cal. App. 3d, 447, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (3d Dist. 1970).
District of Columbia
Bremier v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1972).
Florida
Evancho v. Thiel, 297 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
Georgia
Friend v. General Motors Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763, 165 S.E.2d 734 (1968), cert. dismissed, 225
Ga. 290, 167 S.E.2d 926 (1969).
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The increasing surge of public interest in safety on our roads and
highways has brought a sharp rise in the number of cases in which
persons injured in motor vehicle accidents have sought to hold the
Iowa
Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972).
Maryland
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 321 A.2d 737 (Md. 1974).
Michigan
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
New York
Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 41 App. Div. 2d 54, 341 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1973) (rule disputed at
co-equal intermediate court level by Edgar v. Nachman, 37 App. Div. 2d 86, 323 N.Y.S.2d 5
(1971).
Oregon
May v. Portland Jeep, Inc., 265 Ore. 307, 509 P.2d 24 (1973).
- Pennsylvania
Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
Rhode Island
Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974).
South Carolina
Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
South Dakota
Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., - S.D. -, 205 N.W.2d 104 (1973).
Washington
Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 522 P.2d 829 (1974).
Wisconsin
Grundmanis v. British Motors Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
The following courts have declared that there is no duty to manufacture a crashworthy
automobile:
Illinois
Mieher v. Brown, 54 Ill.2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973)..
Indiana
Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cerl. denied, 390 U.S. 945
(1968); Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir., cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
Mississippi
General Motors Corp. v. Howard, 244 So. 2d 726 (Miss. 1971); Ford Motor Co. v. Simpson, 233
So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1970); Walton v. Chrysler Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969).
Montana
Ford v. Rupple, 504 P.2d 686 (Mont. 1972).
New Jersey
Devaney v. Sarno, 122 N.J. Super. 99, 299 A.2d 95 (1973).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX
manufacturer of the vehicle liable for those injuries which although
resulting from a design defect, did not cause the accident itself.3 Since
the topic of the "uncrashworthy" automobile first received national
attention in Ralph Nader's book, Unsafe At Any Speed,4 hundreds of
studies5 have demonstrated the fact that defective design in motor
vehicles has substantially contributed to the sharp increase in personal
injuries and death as a result of automobile accidents. 6 Congress has
also become involved in the field of defective automobile design, 7
although it seems that it will be at least a few years before any true
substantive action is taken.8
The purpose of this article is to report and analyze the cases that
have dealt with the secondary liability issue, to consider the Florida
approach to the problem, and to analyze other rationales which have
been cited in support of the crashworthiness doctrine.
New York
Edgar v. Nachman, 37 App. Div. 2d 86, 323 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1971) (rule disputed at co-equal
intermediate court level by Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 41 App. Div. 2d 54, 341 N.Y.S.2d 846
(1973).
North Carolina
Bulliner v. General Motors Corp., 54 F.R.D. 479 (E.D.N.C. 1971); Alexander v. Seaboard Air
Line R.R., 346 F. Supp. 320 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
Ohio
Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Burkhard v. Short, 28
Ohio App. 2d 141, 275 N.E.2d 632 (1971).
Texas
General Motors Corp. v. Muncy, 367 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1966); Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F.
Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
West Virginia
McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.W. Va. 1971), affd, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.
1973).
3. Thus the term "secondary impact" developed in cases where the unsafe design feature
allegedly caused or worsened an injury rather than precipitated an accident. See Nader & Page,
Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 645 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Automobile Design]; see generally Annot., 142 A.L.R.3d 560 (1972).
4. R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965).
5. See, e.g., Car Designs Allow Crash Fire Hazard, 8 INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY
(May 29, 1973).
6. The number of registered motor vehicles in the United States in 1972 totaled 121,400,000,
while the number of accidents which were reported totaled 17,000,000. NATIONAL SAFETY
COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 40 (1973).
7. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1381-1431
(1974). At this time 48 motor vehicle safety standards have been established under the authority of
this Act. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 501-80 (Supp. 1973). Section 571 sets forth the specific safety
standards. For example, Standard No. 201 deals with occupant protection in interior impact and
Standard No. 203 is concerned with impact protection for the driver from the steering control
system.
8. See Comment, The Liability of an Automobile Manufacturer for Failure to Design a
Crashworthy Vehicle, 10 WILLAMETTE L.J. 38 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Crashworthy Vehicle].
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II. AUTOMOBILE PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN GENERAL
The most important decision in automobile products liability law
is MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 9 The question for determination in
that case was whether the manufacturer owed a duty of care to any
person but the immediate purchaser.10 The court, speaking through
Justice Cardozo, avoided the requirement of privity by concluding that
the manufacturer was negligent rather than basing the decision on a
contract theory. "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably
certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then
a thing of danger."'" Therefore, the manufacturer will be held repon-
sible for placing a defective automobile in the stream of commerce.
The courts since MacPherson have held that a manufacturer of
automobiles is under a duty to construct a vehicle that is free of latent
and hidden defects. 12 The theory of implied warranty came to the
forefront in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors. 13 In that case, the court
stated:
[U]nder modern marketing conditions, when a manufac-
turer puts a new automobile in the stream of trade and
promotes its purchase by the public, an implied warranty
that it is reasonably suitable for use as such accompanies it
into the hands of the ultimate purchaser. Absence of agency
between the manufacturer and the dealer who makes the
ultimate sale is immaterial. 14
As the new concept of "strict liability" to the consumer began to
develop, "warranty" soon proved to be an unsatisfactory and restricted
basis for many types of actions.' 5 The word "warranty" was therefore
omitted when the strict liability section of the Second Restatement of
Torts was proposed. The result was section 402A,1 6 which has become
9. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
10. Id. at 385, 111 N.E. at 1051. The immediate purchaser in this case was the retailer.
11. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
12. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495. 503 (8th Cir. 1968).
13. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
14. Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84. Moreover,
[iln a society such as ours, where the automobile is a common and necessary adjunct of
daily life, and where its use is so fraught with danger to the driver, passengers and the
public, the manufacturer is under a special obligation in connection with the construc-
tion, promotion and sale of his cars.
Id. at 387, 161 A.2d at 85.
15. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 656 (4th ed. 1971); Prosser, The Assault
Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1)'applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
1974]
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one of two theories which courts normally accept when adopting the
strict liability concept.
The other strict liability concept was espoused in Greenman v.
Yuma Power Products, Inc., 17 which involved a defective power tool.
The court stated the rule to be that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable
in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to
be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being."' 8 The court held that in order to
establish the manufacturer's liability, it was sufficient that the plaintiff
proved he was injured while using the product in a way it was
intended to be used. In a subsequent decision the California court held
that since an injury was a result of a hidden defect in design and
manufacture that made the product unsafe for its intended use,' 9 strict
liability should be applied to the automobile manufacturer."0
It is beyond dispute that the manufacturer of a product is under a
duty of reasonable care to design it so that it will be reasonably safe for
its intended use, 2 ' and if it is not so designed, the manufacturer will be
found to have breached that duty.2 2 The rule that has emerged is that
the manufacturer is liable for negligence in the construction or sale of
any product which may reasonably be expected to be capable of
inflicting substantial harm if it is defective. 23
The remaining question, however, is whether the automobile
manufacturer is under a duty to protect the consumer from injury
produced by design defects which do not cause collisions, but produce
injury as a result of the impact. This is the concept of the "second
accident."
III. EVANS AND ITS PROGENY
The leading case denying recovery against the manufacturer for
failure to produce a "crashworthy" vehicle is Evans v. General Motors
Corp.24 Plaintiffs decedent was fatally injured when the 1961 Chev-
rolet station wagon in which he was riding was struck broadside in an
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
17. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
18. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
19. Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. The court stated that the
purpose of such liability is to insure that the cost of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather
than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.
Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
20. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
21. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 (4th ed. 1971).
22. A design defect involves improper planning of the product's form or structural quality.
In contrast, a defect in construction involves carelessness in the actual assembling of the product.
Crashworthy Vehicle, supra note 8, at 40 n.8.
23. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 643 (4th ed. 1971).
24. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as
Evans].
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intersection. Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court alleging that
the death was proximately caused by the use of X-frame construction
in manufacturing the vehicle. 25 Plaintiffs complaint charged negli-
gence, breach of implied warranty, and strict liability in tort. 26 The
lower court dismissed all three counts for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, and the decision was affirmed on
appeal.
The majority of the court stated: "The intended purpose of an
automobile does not include its participation in collisions with other
objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that
such collisions may occur. '27 The court indicated that a manufacturer
is not under a duty to make an "accident-proof" vehicle and further
noted that any requirement that a manufacturer construct a vehicle in
which it would be safe to collide would be a legislative rather than a
judicial function.28
The Evans decision, although adopted by approximately one-half
of the courts that have considered the issue, 29 has been almost uni-
formly criticized by the commentators. 30 Generally, the criticism has
centered on the fact that the majority of the court simply did not grasp
the central issue in the case. 3' The main focus of the majority opinion
was whether General Motors had a duty to manufacture an
"accident-proof or fool-proof' automobile. 32 However, the real ques-
tion, as stated by Judge Kiley in the dissent, is whether the manufac-
turer has a duty "to use such care in designing its automobiles that
reasonable protection is given purchasers against death and injury
from accidents which are expected and foreseeable yet unavoidable by
the purchaser despite careful use."'33
25. Plaintiff's amended complaint incorporated a reprint of a publication in which a rival
manufacturer advertised the alleged superiority of its perimeter frame over the "X" frame used by
other automobile makers. 359 F.2d at 823.
26. Id. at 824.
27. Id. at 825.
28. Id. at 824.
29. See note 2 supra.
30. See Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars,
69 HARv. L. REV. 863 (1956); Automobile Design, supra note 3; Sklaw, "Second Collision"
Liability: The Need for Uniformity, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 499 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
"Second Collision" Liability]; Comment, Torts: Automobile Manufacturer's Liability for "Sec-
ondary Impact" Injuries, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 296 (1970); Note, 19 Am. U. L. REV. 273 (1970);
Note, 80 HARV. L. REv. 688 (1967); Note, 52 IOWA L. REv. 953 (1967); Note, 20 U. KAN. L.
REV. 179 (1971); Note, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 299 (1969). But see Hoenig & Werber, Automobile
"Crashworthiness": An Untenable Doctrine, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 578, 1971 INS. L.J. 583
(1971); Pawlak, Manufacturers Design Liability: The Expanding Frontiers of the Law, 19
DEFENSE L.J. 143 (1970).
31. See, e.g., Crashworthy Vehicle, supra note 8.
32. "A manufacturer is not under a duty to make his automobile accident-proof or fool-
proof; nor must he render the vehicle 'more' safe where the danger to be avoided is obvious to
all." 359 F.2d at 824.
33. Id. at 827. "A refusal to accept the dissent's characterization of the duty question would
set the development of the common law of auto design back thirty years." Automobile Design,
supra note 3 at 656.
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A further weakness of the majority opinion's "accident-proof'
proposition 34 is its sole reliance as authority on the New York case of
Campo v. Scofield.35 In Campo an "onion-topping" machine rather
than an automobile caused the injury. 36 The court's attention in
Campo was centered upon whether a manufacturer had a duty to
design the machine with a safety guard to prevent injury to a user
caused by a patent defect. This decision is very questionable authority
concerning the frame design of a motor vehicle 37 in light of the great
reliance on mass use of the automobile. It has been said that such a
"latent defect rule is a completely unsound approach to design defect
problems. "38
It appears that the same decision could have been reached in
Evans on the basis of insufficient evidence rather than the court's final
determination that a manufacturer could not be held responsible under
any circumstances for failure to guard against the possible results
of automobile collisions. 39 The decision in Evans must therefore be
viewed not only as poorly reasoned, but also as unnecessary.
Reasoning similar to that used in Evans was utilized in Willis v.
Chrysler Corp.,40 where summary judgment was granted in favor of
the manufacturer. Willis was driving a police car when struck by
another vehicle; the impact caused the 1963 Plymouth police vehicle to
break into two sections killing all occupants. 41 The court stated that
34. See note 32 supra.
35. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
36. The plaintiff in Campo was engaged in feeding onions into the machine when his hands
became caught in its revolving steel rollers and were badly injured. Plaintiff brought suit against
the manufacturer alleging that it had been negligent in failing to equip the machine with a guard
or stopping device. The Appellate Division ordered the complaint dismissed and the decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Id.
Even assuming, though not conceding, Campo to be good law, the analogy to the
standard of care owed in the manufacturer of an automobile leaves something to be
desired. The devastation caused by a defectively designed automobile, unleashed upon a
society so totally dependent upon that vehicle, leads one to conjure catastrophies of
gigantic proportions, hardly commensurate with those we foresee being caused by a
defective "onion topper."
Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 20 Md. App. 518, -, 317 A.2d 494, 507 (Ct. Spec. App. 1974)
(dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original).
37. See "Second Collision" Liability, supra note 30, at 511 n.57.
38. Askew v. Howard-Cooper Corp., 263 Ore. 184, 188, 502 P.2d 210, 212 (1972) (dissent-
ing opinion). See also Houser, Crashworthiness: Defective Product Design-Secondary Impact
Liability in Texas, 4 ST. MARY's L.J. 303 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Defective Product Design];
"Second Collision" Liability, supra note 30. It should also be observed that Campo was decided
in 1950, long before the trend in the judiciary to favor the consumer and the adoption of the
theories of breach of implied warranty and strict liability in tort came into play. Compare, e.g.,
Campo with Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
39. Moreover,
[t]he [Evans] view based on "no duty" would allow the automotive industry to manufac-
ture their automobile from egg shells and to use such designs as would guarantee certain
death in every accident, regardless of severity. This position is plainly untenable.
Defective Product Design, supra note 38, at 307.
40. 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
41. Plaintiff contended that the defendant manufacturer breached an implied warranty of
fitness because the design of the car allowed it to separate into two sections as a result of the
collision.
COMMENTS
the duty which an automobile manufacturer owes to the users of its
product "does not extend to require a manufacturer to design his
product so that it is accident proof or fool proof."42 The court failed to
recognize the fact that a manufacturer could be held responsible for
providing reasonable protection to users of its vehicles from foresee-
able accidents while not being held to a duty to design and construct
an accident proof automobile. As authority for this proposition, the
court relied on Gossett v. Chrysler Corp.43 and Evans v. General
Motors Corp.4 4
In Gossett, the plaintiff was driving a new Dodge truck when its
hood became disengaged and flew up in front of the plaintiff, thereby
obscuring his vision. The plaintiff lost control of the vehicle as a result
of the hood's disengagement and suffered severe injuries. The sole
issue presented was whether there was negligence on the part of the
manufacturer in the design of the hood latch.45 It can clearly be seen
that the court in Gossett was not concerned with a "secondary acci-
dent" but rather a simple case of negligent design. Further, the court
specifically noted that under Ohio law, which was applicable to the
case, an automobile is not regarded as a dangerous instrumentality per
se. 
46
The Evans and Willis decisions are the most frequently cited
authorities for the determination by courts that a manufacturer has no
duty to produce a crashworthy vehicle. From the above discussion,
two propositions should be evident. First, both the Evans and Willis
decisions are based on authority which is somewhat questionable. It is
submitted that the various courts which have followed the two cases
have not analyzed the decisions in depth and the "no duty" proposition
has thus continued to spiral on a faulty premise. Second, in states such
as Florida where the automobile is considered a dangerous instrumen-
tality per se 4 7 and where the courts have been increasingly liberal in
the area of products liability, 48 the "no duty" theory of manufacturer
liability should not be applicable.
42. 264 F. Supp. at 1011. It should be noted that there apparently was no evidence that the
design of the vehicle was defective or contributed to the splitting apart in any respect. Further,
this holding was confined to a "high speed collision" and it is doubtful that the court would reach
the same result if the impact speed had been greatly reduced. Defective Product Design, supra
note 38, at 308.
43. 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966).
44. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
45. The court reversed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff and stated that
[iut is the duty of a manufacturer to use reasonable care under the circumstances to so
design his product as to make it not accident or fool proof, but safe for the use for which
it is intended. This duty includes a duty to design the product so that it will fairly meet
any emergency of use which can reasonably be anticipated. The manufacturer is not an
insurer that his product is, from a design viewpoint, incapable of producing injury.
Gosset v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84, 87 (6th Cir: 1966).
46. Id. at 88.
47. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
48. See Hicks & Sternlieb, Products Warranty Law in Florida-A Realistic Overview, 25 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 241 (1971).
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The Evans theory was again accepted in Schemel v. General
Motors Corp.49 The plaintiff sought recovery against General Motors
for manufacturing and putting into the stream of commerce motor cars
with a capacity to be operated at speeds in excess of 100 miles per
hour. Plaintiff had been seriously injured when the automobile in
which he was riding was struck by a vehicle manufactured by the
defendant and being driven at a speed of approximately 115 miles per
hour. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, finding that the
manufacturer was not responsible, held that the vehicle in question
was not dangerous for its lawful use, i.e., the purpose for which it was
supplied. Judge Kiley again dissented and stated that he would hold
that:
General Motors had the duty to foresee that if it designed its
product with a speed capacity far exceeding any legal limit
and emphasized that capacity in its advertising, recklessly
inclined drivers would be encouraged to put that capacity to
abnormal use and expose innocent persons like Schemel to
the unreasonable risk that what happened would happen.50
The most recent case adopting the Evans position is Frericks v.
General Motors Corp.51 Plaintiff was a passenger in a 1969 Opel
Kadett two-door sedan. The driver of the vehicle operated it at an
excessive speed and caused it to run off the road and overturn.
Plaintiff alleged that after the car overturned the roof supports col-
lapsed and gave way, unable to support the weight of the vehicle. At
the same time, the seat mechanism in which the plaintiff was reclining
at a five degree angle failed and dropped rearward to an 80 degree
angle. These two conditions were said to combine to cause a second
impact between the plaintiff passenger's head and the collapsing roof,
crushing his skull and causing greatly enhanced injury and damage.
The complaint sounded in negligence, breach of implied warranty and
strict liability in tort. 52
The court examined both Evans and Larsen v. General Motors
Corp.5 3 ahd decided to follow the former rather than the latter.5 4 The
majority opinion appears to have been based on the theory that "so
complex and universal a problem should be left to legislative
decision." '55 However, as noted by Judge Lowe in the dissent: "[T]he
possibility of future adequate legislative standards does not remove the
necessity of presently deciding whether plaintiff should or should not
49. 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968).
50. Id. at 810 (dissenting opinion).
51. 20 Md. App. 518, 317 A.2d 494 (Ct. Spec. App. 1974).
52. Id. at -, 317 A.2d at 498-99.
53. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
54. 20. Md. App. at -, 317 A.2d at 499.
55. Id. at -, 317 A.2d at 500. The court noted that 18 months prior to the Larsen decision,
Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§
1381-1431 (Supp. 1972), and that this Act should serve as a precedent to further legislative action
in the area.
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have an opportunity to prove the allegations made in the complaint. '5 6
Moreover, "[j]uror's judgments would, at best, provide invaluable
indicia of consumer expectations to those legislators formulating stan-
dards, and, at worst, would provide a spur to the representatives of
the people to get on with their task."'5 7
The Frericks court also adopted the Evans proposition that the
"intended use" of a motor vehicle does not include its participation in
collisions with other objects. 5 8 It is submitted that this interpretation
of the "intended use" doctrine5 9 is much too narrow. 60 While the
intended use of the automobile does not specifically include its partici-
pation in collisions, it is, however, clearly a foreseeable danger arising
out of the intended use. 6 1 This foreseeability aspect is supported by
statistics. 6 2 It is clear that the manufacturers are not and cannot be
insurers of the vehicles, but it should be just as clear that they must be
held to a standard of reasonable care in the design of their product to
provide a reasonably safe vehicle in which to travel. One court has
stated the rule alternatively as either that vehicular accidents are so
commonplace as to constitute a readily forseeable misuse of motor
vehicles or that vehicular accidents are incidental to the normal and
intended use of motor vehicles on today's highways. 63
Under this approach to the concept of intended purpose and
normal use, the manufacturer would not be held liable for the
vicissitudes of using a passenger automobile on a racetrack or
a plowed field, for example, but might be held liable for the
foreseeable, though accidental, traumatic consequences of the
use of passenger cars on highways by occupants.
64
The Maryland Court of Appeals implicitly overruled Frericks in Volks-
wagen of America v. Young. 65
IV. THE LARSEN APPROACH
The backbone of the cases imposing a duty upon the manufac-
turer to design a "crashworthy" automobile is Larsen v. General
56. 20 Md. App. at __, 317 A.2d at 507, quoting Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d
822, 828 (7th Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion).
57. 20 Md. App. at -, 317 A.2d at 507.
58. Id. at -, 317 A.2d at 505.
59. As a general rule, the manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care under the
circumstances in the design of a product but is not an insurer that his product is incapable of
producing injury. This duty of design is met when the article is safe for its intended use and when
it will fairly meet any "emergency of use" which is foreseeable. Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,
391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). See generally Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 560 (1972).
60. Cf. Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974).
61. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 646 (4th ed. 1971); Larsen v. General Motors
Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502-03 (8th Cir. 1968).
62. The chances of an automobile becoming involved in an accident are slightly less than 1.5
in 10. See note 6 supra.
63. Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1072-1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
64. Id. at 1073.
65. 321 A.2d 737 (Md. 1974).
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Motors Corp.66 While driving a 1963 Chevrolet Corvair, plaintiff
received serious injuries when a head-on collision caused a severe
rearward thrust of the steering mechanism into his head. The com-
plaint alleged negligence in the design of the steering assembly, a
failure to warn of such latent dangerous condition, and breach of
express and implied warranties of merchantability for the vehicle's
intended use.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit analyzed all of the
propositions propounded by Evans and flatly rejected them. The court
decided that the interpretation of "intended use" by General Motors 67
was much too narrow and unrealistic. 68 The Larsen court stated that
"the intended use of an automotive product contemplates its travel on
crowded and high speed roads and highways that inevitably subject it
to the foreseeable hazards of collisions and impacts. '69 Thus the court
concluded that there was no sound reason why the manufacturer
should not be held to a reasonable duty of care in the design of its
vehicle to minimize the effect of accidents. At the very least, thought
the court, the unreasonable risk should be eliminated and reasonable
steps should be taken in design to minimize the injury-producing effect
of impacts. 70
As to the second count of the complaint, the Larsen court held
that "[t]he failure to use reasonable care in design or [the discovery] of
a defective design gives rise to the reasonable duty on the manufac-
turer to warn of this condition."'7'
The Larsen decision was followed in the case of Mickle v.
Blackmon. 72 Plaintiff was a passenger in a 1949 Ford which was
involved in a collision with another vehicle. Plaintiff was impaled on
the gearshift lever as a result of the accident, causing permanent
paralysis. The evidence indicated that the gearshift knob became
fragile due to the effects of sunlight and had shattered upon impact
66. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) [hereinafter referred to as Larsen].
67. Defendant General Motors contended that it had no duty to produce a vehicle in which
it is safe to collide or which is accident-proof or incapable of injurious misuse. It viewed its duty
as extending only to producing a vehicle that is reasonably fit for its intended use, or for the
purpose for which it was made, and that is free from hidden defects. G.M. further propounded
that the intended use of a vehicle and the purpose for which it is manufactured does not include
its participation in head-on collisions or any other type of impact, regardless of the
manufacturer's ability to foresee that such collisions may occur. Id. at 498.
68. Id. at 502.
69. Id. at 504.
70. Id. at 503.
71. Id. at 505. The court relied in this context on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395,
comment f (1965), which states:
The particulars in which reasonable care is usually necessary for protection of those
whose safety depends upon the character of chattels [includes] the making of such
inspections and tests during the course of manufacture and after the article is completed
as the manufacturer should recognize as reasonably necessary to secure the production
of a safe article . ...
72. 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as Mickle].
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with the body of the plaintiff. 73 The court held that a manufacturer
owes a duty of reasonable care to minimize the risk of death or serious
injury to collision victims. 74 One of the obvious reasons for the court's
holding in this case was the fact that the entire incident might have
been avoided by a minor, inexpensive change-the substitution of a
black knob for a white one which would have resisted deterioration
from sunlight.
Both the Larsen and Mickle cases were decided on the basis of
general negligence principles. The transition from negligence to strict
liability75 began in Grundmanis v. British Motor Corp. 76 The basis of
the plaintiffs claim was that the defendant was negligent in the design
of the vehicle because the fuel tank was located under the trunk and
immediately behind the passenger compartment. The MGB au-
tomobile burst into flames upon impact with another vehicle when its
fuel tank ruptured. The court noted that Wisconsin had recently
determined that products liability cases are to be governed by strict
liability in tort.77 In denying a motion to dismiss, the court approved
the reasoning of Larsen and specifically rejected the Evans approach,
thereby finding it unnecessary to discuss the strict liability doctrine.
The court's decision was clearly based on its belief that the foreseeabil-
ity of accidents is a matter of public and common knowledge. It
believed that the manufacturer must accept the duty of protecting the
user from unreasonable risk of injury due to negligence in design. 78
The Larsen rationale was approved in Dyson v. General Motors
Corp.,79 where the plaintiff was injured when the roof of his 1965
Buick Electra collapsed after the vehicle overturned.80 The court, in
denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings, upheld the plaintiffs
theories of negligence and strict liability based on section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 8' The court determined that
[I]t is the obligation of an automobile manufacturer to pro-
vide more than merely a movable platform capable of trans-
73. The evidence further revealed that Ford had changed its practice one year after the
manufacture of the automobile and had begun to paint the knobs a different color to avoid
deterioration.
74. The court stated that it is a matter of common knowledge that a significant proportion of
all automobiles produced in this country are involved in collisions at some time during their use.
252 S.C. at 230, 166 S.E.2d at 185.
75. See "Second Collision" Liability, supra note 30.
76. 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
77. Id. at 306.
78. Id; cf. Gray v. General Motors Corp., 434 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1970) (implicitly accepting
the trial court's instruction on a strict liability concept). See also "Second Collision" Liability,
supra note 30.
79. 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
80. Four theories of liability were alleged: (1) negligence in design and manufacture; (2)
breach of express and implied warranties of fitness; (3) strict liability; and (4) conscious or negli-
gent misrepresentation. Id. at 1066.
81. See note 16 supra.
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porting passengers from one point to another. The passengers
must be provided a reasonably safe container within which to
make the journey.82
Similarly, in Badorek v. General Motors Corp.,83 a Rambler
automobile struck the rear end of a 1965 Corvette Sting Ray in which
the plaintiffs were passengers. The impact of the two cars caused the
fuel tank of the Corvette to rupture, resulting in a gasoline fire which
caused death and serious injury. The court held that automobile
manufacturers are strictly liable for secondary or enhanced injuries
caused by "unreasonably dangerous defective design and construction
of their products under the conditions described in section 402A. ' '84
The case of Passwaters v. General Motors Corp.85 is noteworthy
because it involved a situation where the plaintiff collided with an
uncrashworthy automobile as opposed to riding in it.86 Plaintiff was a
passenger on a motorcycle which collided with a Buick Skylark.
Plaintiffs leg was severely mangled when it came into contact with the
wheel cover of the Buick. The cover consisted of unshielded metal
flippers which spun when the wheel rotated. The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit reversed a directed verdict for General Motors. In
holding that the Iowa courts would apply the doctrine of strict liability
to a person in the plaintiffs status, the federal court concluded that
although the specific injury and the manner in which it occurred may
have been difficult to foresee, nevertheless the unshielded operation of
propeller-like blades on the four wheels of an automobile created a
high risk of foreseeable harm to the general public. 87
One of the most recent decisions outside Florida to join the
growing number of courts that follow the Larsen approach is Turcotte
v. Ford Motor Co. 88 Plaintiff filed suit to recover for the wrongful
death of his son. The decedent was a passenger in a 1970 Maverick
82. 298 F. Supp. at 1073.
83. 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (3d Dist. 1970).
84. Id. at 925, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 320. Moreover, the court stated that the rationale of Evans is
difficult to follow:
[T]o manufacture an automobile which is accident proof is an obvious impossibility--to
say so is to express a truism. To adopt that truism as the basis for a rule that, therefore,
under the law of negligence, there is no duty to exercise care to design a "safer"
automobile is a non sequitur. It confuses crash-proof with crash-worthiness.
Id. at 919, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 316 (emphasis added). See also Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.
3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
85. 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972).
86. See Crashworthy Vehicle, supra note 8.
87. 454 F.2d at 1275-76. The court also maintained that, although "[a] vehicle cannot be
made accident free ... it is now recognized that a manufacturer does hold a duty to exercise a
reasonable degree of care to make the car itself inherently danger free." Id. at 1276. Contra,
Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex. 1963), where a seven-year-old child drove
his bicycle into the rear of a 1957 Dodge striking his temple upon the rear fin of the vehicle. The
court granted summary judgment for the defendant and stated that "the manufacturer has no
obligation to so design his automobile that it will be safe for a child to ride his bicycle into it while
the car is parked." Id. at 679.
88. 494 F.2d 173 (lst Cir. 1974).
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when the vehicle was struck by another car and burst into flames.
Plaintiff contended that Ford's positioning of the gas tank in the
Maverick in such manner that the tank's top also served as the floor of
the trunk constituted a defect in design which caused his son's death
by fire. The lower court awarded judgment to the plaintiff which was
affirmed on appeal. The court agreed with the trial judge that the
Rhode Island courts would adopt the Larsen interpretation of "in-
tended use" in construing the doctrine of strict products liability. 89
V. THE FLORIDA VIEWPOINT
Florida is one of the more recent jurisdictions to approve the
crashworthiness doctrine as originally propounded in Larsen. In Evan-
cho v. Thiel, 90 the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that
an automobile manufacturer may be liable for negligence and breach
of implied warranty9 1 where a defect in manufacture causes injury to a
user as a result of a collision, even though the defect was not a cause of
the collision. The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she was
injured by reason of a negligent design or manufacturing defect in a
car produced and sold by the defendant, Ford Motor Co. The
plaintiffs 1970 Mercury Montego was involved in a collision with
another vehicle. As a result of the impact, a passenger in the rear seat
of the Montego was thrown forward and struck the back of the front
seat. Upon impact, not only did the locking mechanism designed to
lock the front seat to the right rail (which was mounted on the floor)
fail, causing the right side of the front seat to be thrown forward, but
as the seat moved forward, sharp and pointed edges of the rail were
exposed as well. The complaint averred that after striking the back of
the front seat, the passenger's body fell to the floor of the automobile
and his head struck the exposed sharp edges of the rail, ultimately
causing his death. 92
The lower court in Evancho dismissed the complaint for failure to
89. Id. at 181.
A literal Evans-type interpretation of "intended use" fails to recognize that the phrase
was first employed in early products-liability cases . . merely to illustrate the broader
central doctrine of foreseeability. The phrase was not meant to preclude manufacturer
responsibility for the probable ancillary consequences of normal use. . . . Instead, a
manufacturer "must also be expected to anticipate the environment which is normal for
the use of his product and ... he must anticipate the reasonably foreseeable risks of the
use of his product in such an environment."
Id., quoting Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 83-84 (4th Cir. 1962). Accord, Bremier
v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1972).
90. 297 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), petition for cert. filed, No. 73-764 (January 26, 1974)
[hereinafter referred to as Evancho].
91. The cause of action mentioned by the court would be based upon breach of an implied
warranty of merchantability. If an automobile manufacturer is placed under a duty to provide a
crashworthy vehicle under the premise that accidents are foreseeable, an automobile that enhances
injuries in a collision would be deemed to be unfit for the ordinary purpose for which such vehicle
is used. See generally Hicks & Sternlieb, Products Warranty Law in Florida-A Realistic
Overview 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 241 (1971).
92. 297 So. 2d at 42.
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state a cause of action against Ford. The Third District, noting that no
Florida case had yet decided the point, reversed the dismissal. 93 The
court noted that the reasoning in Larsen was more in keeping with the
law of Florida. 94 It should be noted that the deceased in Evancho,
although a passenger or user of the vehicle, was apparently not the
purchaser of the automobile. Since the court made no mention of
privity, the fact that it expressly held that the manufacturer could be
held liable for breach of an implied warranty could be viewed as
another breakthrough in the field of warranty in Florida. However, it
is more likely that this will be interpreted as falling within the
"dangerous instrumentality" exception to the privity requirement.9 5
In keeping with the increasingly consumer-oriented atmosphere
created by the Florida courts, the Evancho decision is approved as
being the more modern and realistic approach. The court in Evancho
adopted the Larsen approach but gave few reasons and cited few
authorities for its final determination. There are, however, a variety of
grounds for a Florida court to adopt Larsen rather than Evans.
First of all, one of the major reasons for following the "no duty"
theory has been that such a drastic change is for the legislature and not
the judiciary. 9 6 This argument may easily be dismissed in Florida, as
the courts in this state have traditionally been in the forefront of
judicial action despite the fact that the legislature has not previously
acted in the area. 9 7
A second major reason in support of the crashworthiness doctrine
in Florida is that the automobile in this state is considered a dangerous
instrumentality per se. 9 8 Many jurisdictions are not in accord with that
view. 99 It should thus be clear that when a motor vehicle is operated
93. The court certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida as a matter of
great public interest:
Whether a manufacturer of automobiles may be liable to a user of the automobile for a
defect in manufacture which causes injury to the user when the injury occurs as the
result of a collision and the defect did not cause the collision.
Petition for cert. filed, No. 73-764 (January 26, 1974).
94. 297 So. 2d at 44.
95. See Keller v. Eagle Army-Navy Dep't Stores, Inc., 291 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974);
Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co., 208 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1968); Marrillia v. Lyn Craft Boat Co., 271
So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). For a discussion of this subject, see Hicks & Sternlieb, Products
Warranty Law in Florida-A Realistic Overview, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 241 (1971).
96. E.g., Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 20 Md. App. 518, 317 A.2d 494 (Ct. Spec. App.
1974); Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
97. For example, Florida was the first state to allow joinder of an insurance carrier without
legislative action. Shingleton v. Bussy, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969). Florida courts also have
adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence despite the argument that such a drastic shift is
for the legislature. Hoffman v. Jones, 287 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). See also Baumgardner v.
American Motors Corp., - Wash. -, 522 P.2d 829 (1974), wherein the court stated:
[W]e reject the manufacturer's argument . . . that the court cannot impose such a
standard of conduct upon a manufacturer, but must defer to legislative action . . . This
overlooks the elementary concept that determination of the existence or nonexistence of
a duty is always the function of the court.
Id. at 833.
98. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920); Keller v. Eagle
Army-Navy Dep't Stores, Inc., 291 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
99. E.g., Ohio. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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on a public highway, Florida courts recognize that an instrumentality
is being used which can cause serious harm or injury to other users of
the road, drivers and pedestrians alike. Although the dangerous in-
strumentality doctrine is used in Florida to hold the owner of the
vehicle vicariously responsible for the acts of the operator while using
the automobile with his knowledge, permission and consent, it should
be equally clear that the automobile is not only a dangerous instrumen-
tality to victims of the operator's negligence, but also a dangerous
instrumentality for the purpose of holding the manufacturer liable. 10 0
Extending this further, the automobile is considered a dangerous in-
strumentality because accidents are foreseeable. When an automobile is
involved in an accident, serious injury and death are likely to occur.
Thus, with this understanding, the manufacturer should be under a
duty to produce a motor vehicle which will be reasonably safe to
human beings when involved in a collision. 101 The word "reasonably"
must be stressed because obviously the manufacturer cannot be an
insurer of his product and thus is under no obligation to produce an
accident proof vehicle. However, it is submitted that the manufacturer
is not unduly burdened by the imposition of a duty to produce a
reasonably crashworthy automobile. It should be noted that the test of
reasonableness is also significant when a court accepts a cause of
action based upon section 402A. According to this section, the product
must be sold in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer."'
10 2
Furthermore, the Florida courts have traditionally been in the
forefront in the field of products liability, and have been increasingly
consumer oriented. 10 3 For example, in Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 10 4
the plaintiff sued the manufacturer for injuries that occurred when he
sat in an aluminum rocking chair and his finger was cut off by the
moving parts of the chair as it extended over the armrest. The Su-
preme Court of Florida held that a manufacturer is under a duty to
design its product to be safe for use. Matthews has been the leading
case holding that a product, although not a dangerous instrumentality
per se, can subject the manufacturer to liability if a user sustains an
injury as a result of an inherently dangerous condition in an otherwise
innocent looking instrumentality.'0 5
100. See generally 3 FLA. JUR. Automobiles & Other Motor Vehicles § 152 (1955).
101. The general test of foreseeability in Florida was stated in Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co.
v. Pope, 127 So. 2d 441, 442-43 (Fla. 1961):
[F]oreseeability depends in part on whether the type of negligent act involved in a
particular case has so frequently previously resulted in the same type of injury or harm
that "in the field of human experience" the same type of result may be expected again.
The test was not intended to . . . imply that a plaintiff, in order to recover in a
negligence action, must prove that the particular causative act had frequently occurred
before, and that it had frequently resulted in the same particular injury to the plaintiff.
102. See note 16 supra.
103. See generally Hicks & Sternlieb, Products Warranty Law in Florida-A Realistic
Overview, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 241 (1971).
104. 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956).
105. "Dangerous instrumentalities have been defined as those which by nature are reason-
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In Keller v. Eagle Army-Navy Department Stores, Inc., 106 a
Florida court for the first time expressly adopted the section 402A 10 7
strict liability theory in products liability law. ' 0 8 Plaintiff was a minor
who sustained serious burns resulting from the explosion of a mosquito
repellent device called a "Glo-Lite." The torch had been lit in accor-
dance with the instructions contained thereon and had been handled in
a manner consistent with its intended use.' 0 9 In holding that the
plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence tending to show that the
torch in question was improperly and dangerously designed and con-
structed, the court stated that section 402A represented the proper rule
of law to be applied in such a situation. 10 Moreover,
Florida has long recognized that certain instrumentalities are
"dangerous instrumentalities" per se, such as automobiles
driven on the highways . . . and strict liability has been
imposed upon the owner thereof for their improper use. '"l
It seems clear that the manufacturer of a dangerous instrumentality
per se, such as an automobile, should be subject to liability for defects
unknown to the consumer which can enhance injuries in an
accident. 112
One practical consideration that may affect the crashworthiness
doctrine in a jurisdiction such as Florida is the doctrine of comparative
negligence. Any negligence on the part of the plaintiff in operating the
vehicle then becomes a matter of degree. One example in this particu-
lar area is the use of seat belts. If the plaintiffs injuries are enhanced
by striking an object in the vehicle as the result of a collision, may
evidence be introduced to show that the plaintiff failed to use the seat
belts that are provided in the automobile? 1 3 If so, it is quite possible
that the jury would reduce the plaintiffs recovery or find that the
plaintiff was completely responsible for his enhanced injuries. Unless
seat belt use becomes mandatory, either by federal or state legislation,
it will be very difficult if not impossible for a manufacturer to win a
crashworthiness case. However, this should not preclude a court from
imposing upon the manufacturer the duty to produce a crashworthy
ably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently constructed such as airplanes,
automobiles, guns and the like." Id. at 301.
106. 291 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
107. See note 16 supra.
108. Prior to this, strict liability was considered applicable in Florida only by implication.
See Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 211 So. 2d
214 (Fla. 1968).
109. 291 So. 2d at 59.
110. Id. at 61.
111. Id. at 60.
112. See also Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co., 208 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1968), where the
Supreme Court of Florida found liability, absent privity, for breach of warranty involving a
dangerous instrumentality (a propane gas storage tank). Plaintiff in this case was an innocent
bystander.
113. For a full discussion on seat belts, see Comment, The Medical and Legal Problems
Arising From the Failure to Wear Seat Belts, 27 U. MIAMI L. Rv. 130 (1972).
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vehicle. The practical effect of the use or nonuse of seat belts does not
outweigh the potentially dangerous effect of allowing an automobile
manufacturer to design a vehicle in any manner it chooses. Rather it
should be considered as an element of damages.
The only Florida decision that can directly lend support to the
Evancho decision is Noonan v. Buick Co. 114 Plaintiff was operating an
Opel Kadett manufactured by the defendant when plaintiff's three-
year-old son grabbed the steering wheel, thus causing the vehicle to
veer sharply to the right and begin to skid. When plaintiff quickly
turned the wheel to adjust for the skid, the driver's seat suddenly
catapulted him forward and upward causing plaintiffs head to strike
the frame and roof of the automobile, resulting in serious injuries. It
was alleged that the defendant negligently failed to properly secure the
seat to the floor or provide a locking mechanism. 15 The trial judge
dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding that the act of
plaintiffs minor son was the proximate cause of the accident and not
reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. In reversing the dismissal, the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, stated that it could not be
said that, as a matter of law, plaintiff's injury was not a foreseeable
result of the alleged negligence of the defendant. A jury could find that
the injury resulted from the alleged negligence rather than the act
which caused the emergency. 116
One final theory which supports the crashworthiness doctrine is
the adoption of section 398 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which
provides:
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design
which makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manu-
factured is subject to liability to others whom he should
expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable
use for physical harm caused by his failure to exercise
reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or design. 117
114. 211 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
115. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendant was negligent in that:
[T]he defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that any
sudden, erratic movement of said automobile would cause the driver's seat to thrust
upward and forward, and having such knowledge the defendant carelessly and negli-
gently failed to properly secure said seat to the floor or provide a locking mechanism
therefor.
Id. at 55.
116. Id. See also Holman v. Ford Motor Co., 239 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). In
Holman, plaintiff sued for damages when he rammed his 1966 Thunderbird into a parked vehicle
to avoid hitting pedestrians after his brakes failed. After owning the car one year, plaintiff
brought the car to the dealer to have the brakes repaired. Ford delivered to the dealer a new
power brakes booster system which is a sealed, self-contained device. The unit was installed
without alteration by the dealer and the car was tested by the dealer's employees. The car was
returned to the plaintiff and minutes later the brakes failed again. The court held that refusal to
instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur with respect to the booster unit prejudicially
deprived plaintiff of an essential substantive theory of recovery.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965). This doctrine was approved in
Florida in Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956).
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It should be clear that an automobile which contains design defects
which do not initiate an accident but contribute to increasing the
injuries can be, if so found by the trier of fact, a "failure to exercise
reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or design." In order for
this to be determined, therefore, the question of law 118 as to whether
an automobile manufacturer may be liable where a defect in manufac-
ture enhances injuries after an accident occurs, must be answered in
the affirmative.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Evans court and the jurisdictions which subsequently
adopted the "no duty" rules are correct to the extent that they stand for
the proposition that a manufacturer should not be required to produce
a crashproof vehicle. But the line must be drawn at crashproof, not
crashworthy. If the state of the art of the automobile industry is such
that a manufacturer has the ability or technical knowledge to prevent
certain foreseeable situations arising out of ordinary accidents, then
they should be held accountable to the consumer for failing to incorpo-
rate this knowledge into the product they place in the stream of
commerce.
Certainly in Florida where the automobile is a "dangerous in-
strumentality" there is no question that the manufacturer owes to the
ultimate user of said vehicle and, probably, to innocent bystanders1 19
a duty to produce a vehicle which is designed to be reasonably safe. To
the extent that accidents are foreseeable and that subsequent and more
serious second accidents are also foreseeable, this duty should extend to
the manufacturer to act reasonably to prevent and reduce the potential
danger of the second accident.
118. The sole point that all courts seem to agree on is that this is a question of law. Larsen
v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359
F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966). In Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., - Wash. __ __, 522 P.2d
829, 833 (1974), the court stated:
We strongly disavow the notion that the judicial system is incapable of dealing with a
technical issue simply because it may involve testimony from expert witnesses. That is a
common experience which judges and juries deal with daily. The strength of the system
is that it has absorbed, accommodated and resolved disputes of immense complexity and
novelty.
119. See Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co., 208 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1968).
